Monday, August 12, 2013

A Murphy Pojman Justification To Punishment

A Murphy Pojman Justification To Punishment

Summary: Punishment (3/2005 – CII)

Punishment affects everybody in their daily lives whether it is acknowledged or not. In conjunction with the upbringing from parents, these rules and virtues chisel people to become moral agents in society. Yet, there are opposing ideas that punishment is unjust due to human imperfections. But whether the situations of punishment are minor (rehabilitating punishment; probation, jail, etc.) or are severe as the death penalty or a life sentence, using the views of Jeffrie Murphy and of Louis Pojman can resolve that it is morally justified.

*”[Punishment] as a means of transforming the character of the criminal. The goal of punishment is future oriented, but not mainly as a device for securing future compliance to law. Compliance is not the primary aim of punishment but will rather be secured as a by-product of the value that is the primary … instilling in the criminal, not just a fear based in self-interest, but rather a true sense of justice – a desire to do the right thing for the reason.” *-Jeffrie Murphy 476 L 


Quoting Plato’s work is one view that supports the moral justification of punishment – which seems to be the central view by Murphy and similar to Rachel’s theory of rehabilitation. As stated in the preceding quote above, compliance due to the examples of the others being rehabilitated is not the main goal but to help those criminals already incarcerated. Rehabilitating one criminal at a time throughout all the penitentiaries is Murphy’s focus while the deterrence factor of the rehabilitation is a byproduct of the focus. This byproduct also supports the justification for punishing criminals, since this would prevent even more potential crimes. According to Murphy, “[punishment is being used] as a means of transforming the character of the criminal…[so that it may instill] in the criminal…a true sense of justice.” When he or she is allowed back into society, he or she is changed due to the fact that their punishment has transformed the character of the criminal and therefore, should not commit further crimes – knowing all too well what the consequences will be. This betters society by preventing the potential criminal to have a potential victim since rehabilitation eliminates the potential criminal. It also aids the criminal as well because of the criminal’s rehabilitated persona, which would better themselves for their future role in society. If the rehabilitation of the criminal is not to occur, it will directly and indirectly affect society. The direct effect would be the un-rehabilitated persona of the criminal, which leads to further victims and the indirect effect would be that other potential criminals are inclined to commit crimes due to the example of the un-rehabilitated persona of the criminal. For example, the Columbine shootings sparked a chain of rehabilitating events of both direct and indirect affects in society. Directly, the rehabilitation of the criminals abets their life and the future victims if they were not punished. Indirectly, the rehabilitation of the criminals has started a new renaissance on how pre-teens and teenagers interact with their peers. Knowing that the previous treatment of the peers that they feel are “weird” or “un-cool” can negatively affect their psyche. Such a drastic affect, that it can incline people to incur bodily harm to others. Of course, it took years to change society but keep in mind that after the transitional years, there have been no recent attacks the likes of Columbine – thus, bettering our society. Now punishment can also branch into harsher forms like capital punishment. For that, Pojman’s view supports the moral justification of a harsher form of punishment by examining the Nuremberg Trials. Pojman states that “if [one agrees] that under conditions like these the death penalty is morally permissible, then there is one clear case” where severe punishment is morally justified. Assuming that crimes that were discussed in the Nuremberg Trials are morally wrong (Pojman 494 L) and applying Rachel’s Principle of Desert that those who have treated others badly deserve to be treated badly in return (Rachels 486 R). Then according to the two premises above, one can surmise that the criminals in the Nuremberg Trials deserve to be treated badly because they have treated others badly. So according to Rachel and Pojman, this theory compels us to punish those that have treated others bad accordingly. For if absolute abolition of punishment is allowed before the trials, the atrocious war crimes would have been permissible as if it were legally and morally just. But that of course, was not the fate of the criminals. One might say “punishment is to be rejected because of human fallibility in convicting innocent parties and sentencing them to death “(Pojman 498 R). That due to our innate characteristics – of not being perfect – it is inevitable that we are to wrongly process and punish an innocent person. And thus, the value of one innocent person, an innocent person who has not committed a crime needs to be taken into account. Regardless if this person loses their life (severe) or is rehabilitated (minor), they do not deserve it according to the Rachel’s Principle of Desert. To justify this objection, Pojman uses the Best Bet Argument by Ernest van den Haag who (to summarize) states that there are two choices to bet. First, one can bet that punishment (minor and severe) either works or fails. Second, in these two choices above, there are two results that either punishment works or fails. So of the two bets and two results translates to four scenarios; we bet and it works, we bet and it fails, we don’t bet and it works, and we don’t bet and it fails. There is then a set total put into the worth of a murderer and an innocent person. He further adds that it is a given that an innocent’s life is worth double that of a murderer, and thus all the four scenarios are calculated. The result is that he concludes the best bet is that scenario that we bet on punishment and it works (497 L – 498 L). A non-mathematical response to the objection above is the comparison of other deaths. The other deaths are situational deaths that many fail to take note. Pojman states that fire trucks have occasionally kill innocents, and even the defensive strategy of a war yields innocents death. In many cases, the deaths due to human error yields less lives lost compared to the innocent deaths from the other situational deaths (499 L). A response for minor punishment is that although there is discomfort with the punishment, there is no reason for the repeal punishment. The rehabilitation of an innocent person is justifiable for at least it instills good character of justice and it is excusable compared to the severe punishment for the discomfort is short. Although there are innocents that are wrongfully processed and punished, there are safeguards to correct the human error, which further reduce wrongful punishment. It is interesting how one situation can be identified as justifiable and wrong by different people, even though it may yield the greater good. The Plato originated views of Jeffrie Murphy and the Ernest van den Haag, influenced the views of Louis Pojman seems to yield the greater good. Of course “[errors] may be made, regrettable though this is, [it] is not a sufficient reason for [the refusal] to use [punishment], if on balance it serves a just and useful function” (499 L). Society’s betterment rests on the refining of punishment to further lessen errors. If there is such controversy over minimal innocent deaths, the future balancing of society may deteriorate. Without these rules and virtues to help in conjunction with the upbringing, many will fail to become moral agents of society. Thus, lead to our downfall if society cannot discern a sound system or accept some innocent deaths as collateral damage. (Please take note that this paper was written before the school shooting on Thursday, March 24 2005)

Sources
Ethics In Practice. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1997. —